There has been a lot of debate on the importance of protection; does it help to bat in front of a great hitter? It is easy to cite individual examples of players who hit better or worse when their protection situation changed, but this doesn't prove anything, since there will always be hitters who improve or decline just by chance. Protection has a clear effect on runs scored, since a good hitter is more likely than a bad hitter to drive runners in. It also has a clear effect on intentional walks. These will have small secondary effects on raw totals such as hits and home runs, since an intentional walk prevents the batter from getting them; there may also be a larger secondary effect on RBI, since intentional walks are given only with runners in scoring position. I'm interested in finding out whether there is any actual effect on the hitter. When they do pitch to him, does he do better when protected than when unprotected? Thus I will primarily be comparing batting and slugging average. The only previous clear data of this type was a study by Bill James in the 1985 Baseball Abstract, looking at Dale Murphy and Bob Horner. Murphy hit .265 with Horner in the lineup, and .281 with the same power with Horner out. (This is not a statistically significant difference.) It's a large sample, but it's just one player; the effect might not matter for Murphy, but it might affect other players. Now, I have looked at the 1991 AL, and identified twenty-five players who might have benefited from protection. They did not hit any better when protected; therefore, I must conclude that protection is not a significant effect. Details follow. I considered a hitter to be capable of providing protection if he was a regular who had both a slugging percentage of at least .450 and a good reputation. Mike Macfarlane, for example, slugged .506 in a half-season, but I don't think pitchers were frightened when he was on deck. A player was eligible for the study if he had at least 100 AB protected by a big hitter, and 100 AB not protected. If protection helps a player, these players should hit better when protected than when unprotected. If it doesn't help, half should do better and half worse by chance. That's about what happened, with ten of twenty-five hitting better when protected, and fifteen worse. Here is the list of big hitters I used. The criteria were necessarily somewhat subjective; reputation became less important as slugging percentage went up. In particular, hitters in the .450-.470 range had to have a clear reputation. Player Team SLG Baines Oak .473 Belle Cle .540 Boggs Bos .460 Buhner Sea .498 Canseco Oak .556 Carter Tor .503 Clark Bos .466 Davis Min .507 Fielder Det .513 Franco Tex .474 Gonzalez Tex .479 Griffey Sea .527 Hrbek Min .461 Joyner Cal .488 Mack Min .529 Molitor Mil .489 Puckett Min .460 Ripken Bal .566 Sierra Tex .502 Tartabull KC .593 Tettleton Det .491 Thomas Chi .553 Whitaker Det .489 Winfield Cal .472 The non-qualifying regulars over .450 were Downing, Hall, Dave Henderson, Horn, Martinez, Pasqua, Reimer, Greg Vaughn, and White; of these, all but Horn and Reimer were below .470. Moving a few players from one list to the other wouldn't make a significant difference in the study. Here are the twenty-five players, with comments. The "Protected" lines include all plate appearances with any of the big hitters on deck; for all but Downing, Pettis, and Sierra (all Texas players), one big hitter did almost all of the protecting. Roberto Alomar, Toronto AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 637 188 41 11 9 57 4 5 .295 .354 .436 Protected 530 162 32 10 9 46 2 3 .312 .361 .455 Unprotected 107 26 9 1 0 9 2 2 .243 .314 .346 Does it help to bat in front of Joe Carter? Alomar started the season batting second in front of Kelly Gruber, with Carter third. When Gruber went out on May 1 with an injury, Carter moved up to third, and stayed there for almost all of the rest of the season. That looks like a protection situation. Alomar's splits suggest it helps, but see Kelly Gruber below for the other side. Alomar hit for a much higher average with Carter on deck, but it was only 107 AB; he could easily have a one-month slump at the same level. The two lines would match in batting and slugging average if four singles, a double, and a homer (and the six hits) were moved from the "Protected" to the "Unprotected" line. That's the difference between what Alomar hit when unprotected, and what he would be expected to hit if protection had no effect. We'll look at this for all of the players. Brady Anderson, Baltimore AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 256 59 12 3 2 38 5 3 .230 .338 .324 Protected 117 23 7 0 2 22 1 0 .197 .329 .308 Unprotected 139 36 5 3 0 16 4 3 .249 .346 .338 Cal Ripken batted third for Baltimore, and was far better than anyone else in the lineup; this was his MVP season. Anderson batted second half the time he played. In other games, he usually came off the bench and batted in front of almost everyone else, with a short stretch as the leadoff hitter in front of an Orsulak/Milligan platoon. That .197 average stands out because it is below the Mendoza line, but the actual split is small, particularly given the small sample size (the least reliable in the study). The lines would match if six singles were moved to the "Protected" line and two doubles moved back, a net shift of only two total bases. Carlos Baerga, Cleveland AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 593 171 28 2 11 48 6 3 .288 .346 .398 Protected 271 75 12 0 4 22 4 1 .277 .339 .365 Unprotected 322 96 16 2 7 26 2 2 .298 .352 .425 Baerga is a particularly useful case, because we have reasonably large samples of both protected and unprotected play. Baerga usually batted third, in front of Albert Belle. However, Belle missed 39 games (mostly with injuries), and the Indians also juggled the lineup during the season, so Baerga often batted elsewhere. The other batters behind him were never close to Belle's quality; Belle hit 28 homers in 461 at-bats and slugged .540. This was Belle's first full season, but he was a highly regarded prospect, and hit far better than anyone else on the team. Baerga hit somewhat better when he wasn't protected; the two lines above would be a perfect match if one double, one triple, and one homer were transferred to the "Protected" line. George Brett, Kansas City AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 505 129 40 2 10 58 0 8 .255 .327 .402 Protected 395 96 30 0 8 48 0 6 .243 .321 .380 Unprotected 110 33 10 2 2 10 0 2 .300 .352 .482 The classic protection situation: Brett batted third and Danny Tartabull batted cleanup for the Royals all year, except when one of them was hurt. When Tartabull was out of the lineup, the Royals' cleanup hitter was usually someone like Jim Eisenreich. The 102-point difference in slugging looks impressive, but it is just 110 AB; move five hits to the "Protected" line, including both triples, and the split disappears. Still, it's hard to argue that Tartabull's absence hurt Brett. Jose Canseco, Oakland AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 572 152 32 1 44 78 9 6 .266 .359 .556 Protected 422 113 24 1 33 66 9 6 .268 .374 .564 Unprotected 150 39 8 0 11 12 0 0 .260 .315 .533 The protection situation isn't as clear here. Canseco was only considered "Protected" when he batted in front of Harold Baines and his .473 SLG. The "Unprotected" at-bats were split between Dave Henderson, Mark McGwire, and Terry Steinbach in the cleanup spot behind Canseco. Henderson hit almost as well as Baines, but didn't have the reputation. McGwire had the reputation, but had a poor season, hitting only .201 with a .383 SLG. Only Steinbach was your typical non-protecting cleanup hitter. And the split that appears is not at all what you would expect from a lack of protection. The batting and slugging averages are very close; moving the triple to the "Unprotected" line would make them match. But when Canseco could supposedly have been pitched around, he drew 12 BB+HBP instead of the expected 21. Milt Cuyler, Detroit AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 475 122 15 7 3 52 5 2 .257 .335 .337 Protected 109 25 5 0 0 10 1 0 .229 .300 .275 Unprotected 366 97 10 7 3 42 4 2 .265 .348 .355 This is an unusual protection situation, because of the spots in which Cuyler batted. He was protected when he batted leadoff in front of Whitaker. He usually batted ninth, with Phillips in the leadoff spot. Cuyler hit worse when protected, even though you might expect him to be placed in the leadoff spot against pitchers he was expected to hit well. (Phillips was in the lineup in half of those games.) In 109 AB, it's probably mainly a chance split, and not a very large one; moving a single and two triples to the "Protected" line is enough to balance out the splits. Alvin Davis, Seattle AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 462 102 15 1 12 56 0 10 .221 .299 .335 Protected 148 32 2 0 2 8 0 0 .216 .256 .270 Unprotected 314 70 13 1 10 48 0 10 .223 .317 .366 When Davis was protected, he batted in front of Jay Buhner. They were 6th and 7th early in the season, moving to 4th and 5th later. The bottom of Seattle's lineup wasn't stable; Davis never batted in front of the other good hitters (Griffey and Martinez), but batted in front of essentially everyone else other than Harold Reynolds. The split in walks is large, and would be statistically significant in isolation, but Davis didn't show the other expected effects of protection, declining across the board. To balance out the slugging averages, you would need to move four doubles and two homers to the "Protected" line, and six singles back. Brian Downing, Texas AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 407 113 17 2 17 58 8 2 .278 .377 .455 Protected 257 64 8 2 10 30 3 1 .249 .333 .412 Unprotected 150 49 9 0 7 28 5 1 .327 .451 .527 Downing usually batted leadoff for the Rangers. Early in the season, the big hitters batted in the 3-5 spots, with Huson, Petralli, and other weak hitters batting second. Later, Franco and Palmeiro moved to the second spot, both much more likely to drive Downing in if he got on base. Downing walked more when unprotected, but the primary cause of his splits (the largest in AVG and OBP except for Pettis) was the increased average. The lines would match if five singles, one double, and one homer were moved to "Protected." Cecil Fielder, Detroit AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 624 163 25 0 44 78 6 4 .261 .347 .513 Protected 515 136 21 0 39 63 4 4 .264 .346 .532 Unprotected 109 27 4 0 5 15 2 0 .248 .349 .422 Fielder batted cleanup in every Tiger game, usually in front of Mickey Tettleton. When Tettleton wasn't in the lineup, the fifth-place hitter was Incaviglia, Barnes, or sometimes Deer. This looks like a protection situation, although Tettleton's reputation in 1991 is debatable. The splits are the classical argument for protection; Fielder drew fewer walks when protected, and hit for a higher average with more power. But it's not a big difference in 109 AB; a double and two homers moved to the "Unprotected" line with two singles coming back would be enough to eliminate it. Julio Franco, Texas AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 589 201 27 3 15 65 3 2 .341 .408 .474 Protected 370 135 18 3 9 33 1 2 .365 .416 .503 Unprotected 219 66 9 0 6 32 2 0 .301 .392 .425 Franco started the season batting fifth, in front of Kevin Reimer. Later, he moved up, usually batting leadoff or second in front of Palmeiro, or third in front of Sierra. Reimer slugged .477 but didn't have a reputation as a big hitter, and Palmeiro and Sierra were even better. If protection helped a high-average hitter, you would expect to see splits like Franco's. He walked more when unprotected; the walk split is just short of two standard deviations, and goes over if you count walks and HBP. But he gained about as much in hits as he lost in walks. To match the batting and slugging averages, you would need to move eight singles and one triple to the "Unprotected" line. Kelly Gruber, Toronto AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 429 108 18 2 20 31 6 5 .252 .308 .443 Protected 103 25 2 1 3 9 2 1 .243 .310 .369 Unprotected 326 83 16 1 17 22 4 4 .255 .307 .466 Gruber batted third in April in front of Carter, went out on May 1, returned on June 12 in the third spot, and then dropped to lower spots (usually fourth through sixth) on June 20. When he wasn't batting third, he batted in front of a variety of players, including Myers, Mulliniks, Tabler, and Olerud, who was not a star then. These splits are the reverse of what you would expect if protection were an effect. Gruber drew more walks with Carter behind him, and lost some power. It's not that big a split in 103 AB, though; the "Protected" line would be a reasonable slump for him. The lines would match if one double and two homers were moved to the "Protected" line, and two singles moved back. In fact, a normal cause of slumps may have something to do with these splits; 27 of the 103 AB were the week Gruber came back from his injury. (He hit about the same that week as in the other unprotected AB, 6 for 27 with a double and a homer.) Brian Harper, Minnesota AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 441 137 28 1 10 14 6 6 .311 .336 .447 Protected 204 60 5 1 4 6 2 3 .294 .316 .387 Unprotected 237 77 23 0 6 8 4 3 .325 .353 .498 Harper usually batted sixth, sometimes fifth, and sometimes came off the bench. Since the bottom of Minnesota's lineup wasn't stable early in the season, this put him in front of an assortment of weak hitters. Shane Mack started the season as a bench player, batting eighth when he started, but settled in to the seventh spot behind Harper on July 21. Harper slumped late in the season, hitting only eight doubles after the All-Star break; hit protection splits reflect the fact that he was protected during this slump. The doubles split is more than two standard deviations, but it isn't large enough to put the slugging average split over two standard deviations. To balance the batting and slugging averages (but not the lines), we need to move four homers to the "Protected" line and the triple back; to balance the lines themselves would require more changes. Dave Henderson, Oakland AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 572 158 33 0 25 58 4 2 .276 .346 .465 Protected 424 115 28 0 21 34 4 2 .274 .332 .488 Unprotected 148 42 5 0 4 24 0 0 .284 .384 .399 A near-classic situation; Henderson was protected when he batted second in front of Canseco, but not when he batted fifth behind Canseco and Baines, or cleanup behind Canseco with Baines out of the lineup. When Henderson wasn't protected, the hitter behind him was usually Steinbach or McGwire. The splits are exactly what you would expect if protection were an effect; his OBP jumped when unprotected, mainly due to walks (only three intentional) while his power dropped. To get the lines to match, you would need to move three homers and three doubles to the "Unprotected" line, and seven singles back. Wally Joyner, California AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 551 166 34 3 21 52 1 5 .301 .360 .488 Protected 426 134 26 2 15 38 1 5 .315 .368 .491 Unprotected 125 32 8 1 6 14 0 0 .256 .331 .464 Another classic protection situation. Joyner usually batted third with Dave Winfield cleanup, and there were some games in which Joyner batted second with Winfield third. When Winfield wasn't in the lineup, the batter behind Joyner was usually Dave Parker or Gary Gaetti, neither one of whom struck fear in the hearts of opposing pitchers. The batting average splits are similar to Alomar's, but Joyner compensated somewhat by hitting for more power. As with Alomar, the effect is likely to have come from the small sample size. The batting and slugging averages would match if seven singles were moved to the "Unprotected" line, and a homer moved the other way. Joe Orsulak, Baltimore AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 486 135 22 1 5 28 4 3 .278 .321 .358 Protected 276 79 14 1 2 11 3 2 .286 .318 .366 Unprotected 210 56 8 0 3 17 1 1 .267 .323 .348 Orsulak's usual spot was second, in front of Ripken, but he also came off the bench frequently, batting in random lineup spots, and spent one stretch in the cleanup spot in front of Milligan and Evans. I suppose you could say that Orsulak had classic splits; he hit for a higher average when protected, with fewer walks giving him a lower OBP. But the splits are tiny, the smallest in the study; they would match if two singles were moved to the "Unprotected" line. Gary Pettis, Texas AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 282 61 7 5 0 54 0 1 .216 .341 .277 Protected 122 21 3 2 0 16 0 0 .172 .268 .230 Unprotected 160 40 4 1 0 38 0 1 .250 .392 .313 When Pettis was in the starting lineup, he usually batted leadoff or ninth. In both spots, he was often in front of Franco, and occasionally Palmeiro; at other times, he was ninth in front of Downing, or leadoff in front of mediocre hitters. He also came off the bench, usually as a pinch-runner or defensive replacement for outfielders rather than as a pinch-hitter; this put him all over the lineup. The small sample size means that these large splits are less significant than they appear to be. Even the large walk split is under two standard deviations. It's also probably not real; walks are not listed directly in the boxscore, which forced me to guess which one of two players walked when a lineup spot had four AB in five plate appearances. For most playes, this wasn't a serious problem, but Pettis had a lot of games in which he went 0-for-0 after entering as a defensive replacement or pinch-runner. I assumed that he didn't walk in these games, but probably got some wrong. Likewise with the apparently large splits elsewhere; moving four singles and one double to "Protected" will balance the batting and slugging averages. Pettis's splits are of interest because they contribute to the overall totals. Tony Phillips, Detroit AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 564 160 28 4 17 79 3 6 .284 .371 .438 Protected 322 86 13 2 5 41 1 3 .267 .349 .366 Unprotected 242 74 15 2 12 38 2 3 .306 .401 .533 The protection situation is reasonably clear here, and there is a large sample of data. Phillips usually batted leadoff, with Whitaker slugging .489 and batting second. When Whitaker was out of the lineup or batted elsewhere, the second hitter was Moseby, Barnes, Trammell, or Fryman, none of them as good as Whitaker. Phillips also spent some time in the second spot in front of Trammell. For all that Trammell and Whitaker have been connected, Trammell had fallen to a .373 SLG that year. Phillips lost so much power when protected that he had the only split of more than two standard deviations in slugging average in the whole study. If this were all the data available, it would be statistically significant evidence that protection hurts a batter, but given that twenty players were studied, you would expect to find one split this large if there were no effect. To match the lines requires moving 23 total bases; that is, you would have to move six homers to the "Protected" line and take back one single. This is much more than for any other player in the study. Actually, there's a reason which has nothing to do with protection for part of the split. Most of the games Whitaker didn't start were against left-handed pitchers. Phillips, although a switch-hitter, has a large platoon split, but not this large. Luis Polonia, California AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 604 179 28 9 2 52 1 3 .296 .352 .379 Protected 205 56 7 3 1 10 0 1 .273 .320 .351 Unprotected 399 123 21 5 1 42 1 2 .308 .374 .393 Another player with clear protection and a lot of data. Polonia was the Angels' leadoff hitter. Wally Joyner usually batted third, with Schofield, Hill, Sojo, or Felix second, but Joyner also spent a lot of time in the second spot, behind Polonia. Polonia walked less when protected, and this split would actually be statistically significant in isolation. However, he declined in other areas as well. To make the batting and slugging averages match, you would need to move five singles and a double to the "Protected" line. Carlos Quintana, Boston AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 478 141 21 1 11 61 2 3 .295 .375 .412 Protected 198 53 8 0 8 28 1 1 .268 .360 .429 Unprotected 280 99 13 1 3 33 1 2 .314 .389 .400 Another classic protection situation. When Quintana batted third, he was protected by Jack Clark; when he didn't bat third, he usually batted seventh in front of Pena, or sixth in front of assorted hitters. He also came off the bench a lot, which put him in random lineup spots. In any study, you will find some weird splits by chance, and that's what happened here. Quintana hit for a higher average when he wasn't protected, but he lost most of his power. His OPS didn't change at all. Since we are primarily interested in SLG, he is considered a player who improved when protected. The lines have to change a lot to balance; move nine singles to "Protected", and two homers and two doubles to "Unprotected". Kevin Reimer, Texas AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 394 106 22 0 20 33 7 6 .269 .332 .477 Protected 218 63 13 0 7 22 6 3 .283 .365 .445 Unprotected 176 43 9 0 13 11 1 3 .244 .288 .517 A natural protection situation. Reimer often batted fifth or sixth in front of Juan Gonzalez, but he also batted sixth behind Gonzalez, with a weak hitter (often Buechele, but several weaker hitters as well) batting seventh. Reimer also pinch-hit a lot, which put him in random spots near the bottom of the lineup. Yes, the lines above are in the correct order; Reimer hit for more power when he didn't have Gonzalez on deck, but drew more walks when Gonzalez was in position to drive him in. Although his OPS was higher when he was protected, we are primarily interested in SLG, and will consider him as a player who hit better when unprotected. The near-even split of protected and unprotected AB makes his data moderately reliable despite the small sample size. But as with Quintana, the weird splits mean that more change is needed to balance the lines than would be suggested by the difference. We need to move four homers to "Protected", and seven singles and a double back, to switch seven total bases while balancing the batting average. Harold Reynolds, Seattle AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 631 160 34 6 3 72 5 6 .253 .331 .340 Protected 377 106 17 3 2 42 1 1 .281 .353 .358 Unprotected 254 54 17 3 1 30 4 5 .213 .300 .314 The existence of protection is clear here, and Reynolds gives a large sample both ways. When Reynolds batted second, Ken Griffey Jr. was almost always on deck. When he batted leadoff, the #2 hitter was usually Briley or Cotto, and only rarely Martinez. Reynolds hit for a much higher average when protected; this is the most significant batting-average split, although it's just under two standard deviations. But the net gain isn't that great, because he lost a bit of power. To get a good match, you would have to move 14 singles to the "Unprotected" line, and four doubles back. Luis Rivera, Boston AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 414 107 22 3 8 35 3 4 .258 .318 .384 Protected 255 59 11 3 3 19 3 1 .231 .291 .333 Unprotected 159 48 11 0 5 16 0 3 .302 .360 .465 Rivera was protected in an unconventional way. He usually batted ninth, with Wade Boggs batting leadoff. When Boggs batted third, Steve Lyons and Jody Reed, neither one close to Boggs's ability, batted leadoff behind Rivera. Rivera also had a few games in which he batted elsewhere near the bottom of the lineup, in front of miscellaneous mediocre hitters. Rivera hit much better when he didn't have Boggs on deck; he hit like a shortstop when he was protected, and like a high-average power hitter when he was. The splits aren't statistically significant in isolation, but they are fairly strong. To match the lines, you would need to move five singles and two homers to the "Protected" line. Ruben Sierra, Texas AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 661 203 44 5 25 56 0 9 .307 .357 .502 Protected 513 149 29 4 20 45 0 6 .290 .350 .480 Unprotected 148 54 15 1 5 11 0 3 .365 .401 .581 Texas had several excellent hitters to bat behind Sierra. Sierra usually batted cleanup in front of Julio Franco, but also often hit third in front of Rafael Palmeiro or Juan Gonzalez, both certainly capable of protecting him as well as Franco did. The "Unprotected" games were almost all in front of Kevin Reimer, who had a slugging average as high as Franco and Gonzalez had, but didn't have a reputation as a great hitter. Sierra hit much better when he wasn't protected, with three brief hot streaks coinciding with periods in which Reimer batted behind him. Six singles and three doubles would have to be moved to "Protected" to cover the difference. Dale Sveum, Milwaukee AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 266 64 19 1 4 32 1 4 .241 .320 .365 Protected 125 25 11 1 0 17 0 2 .200 .292 .304 Unprotected 141 39 8 0 4 15 1 2 .277 .346 .418 As with Rivera, this isn't what you normally think of as protection, but the effect should be the same. Sveum batted ninth half the time, with leadoff hitter Paul Molitor on deck. Otherwise, he usually batted eighth, with Spiers on deck. It's only a small sample, but it shows the reverse of the expected effects of protection. Sveum hit for a much higher average with decent power and fewer walks when Molitor wasn't on deck to drive him in. To balance the lines, you would need to move four singles and a homer to the "Protected" line. Robin Ventura, Chicago AB H 2B 3B HR BB HBP SF AVG OBP SLG Total 606 172 25 1 23 80 4 7 .284 .367 .442 Protected 505 145 22 1 22 63 3 6 .287 .366 .465 Unprotected 101 27 3 0 1 17 1 1 .267 .375 .327 He barely made the study, but it's a classic case of protection, and he had the biggest gains when protected of anyone in the study. Ventura usually batted third in front of Frank Thomas. When Thomas wasn't batting cleanup, Fisk batted there, and didn't hit well; Ventura also spend a short stretch batting fifth or sixth in front of Sosa. Ventura had strong, classic splits; he had no power at all when Thomas wasn't on deck. To balance the lines, you would need to move three homers and two doubles to "Unprotected", and two singles back. It's not likely that such a large split would happen by chance, but it is possible; the slugging average split still isn't statistically significant, and power hitters can spend one month without hitting any homers. Now, we have twenty-five hitters, of varying quality, style, and protection situations. Some hit better when protected, while some hit worse. Only one individual split in slugging average, none in batting average, and three in walks are more than two standard deviations from even, which is about what you would expect if there were no effect, or if the individual effects were too small to measure. In all, the players had 7407 AB protected, 5092 not protected, and 4032 taking the smaller subset for each player, which is enough to make totals meaningful; the standard deviation of batting average in 5092 AB is only .006. Let's add together the differences, to see what would have to be changed for the players to have matching splits in batting and slugging averages. A plus sign below means that the extra hit would have to be moved to the "Unprotected" totals to get a balance, because the player hit better when protected. 1B 2B 3B HR H TB Alomar +4 +1 0 +1 +6 +10 Anderson +6 -2 0 0 +4 +2 Baerga 0 -1 -1 -1 -3 -9 Brett -3 0 -2 0 -5 -9 Canseco 0 0 +1 0 +1 +3 Cuyler -1 0 -2 0 -3 -7 Davis +6 -4 0 -2 0 -10 Downing -5 -1 0 -1 -7 -11 Fielder -2 +1 0 +2 +1 +8 Franco +8 0 +1 0 +9 +11 Gruber +2 -1 0 -2 -1 -8 Harper 0 0 +1 -4 -3 -13 Henderson -7 +3 0 +3 -1 +11 Joyner +7 0 0 -1 +6 +3 Orsulak +2 0 0 0 +2 +2 Pettis -4 -1 0 0 -5 -6 Phillips +1 0 0 -6 -5 -23 Polonia -5 -2 0 0 -7 -9 Quintana +9 -2 0 -2 +5 -3 Reimer +7 +1 0 -4 +4 -7 Reynolds +14 -4 0 0 +10 +6 Rivera -5 0 0 -2 -7 -13 Sierra -6 -3 0 0 -9 -12 Sveum -4 0 0 -1 -5 -8 Ventura -2 +2 0 +3 +3 +14 TOTALS +22 -13 -2 -17 -10 -78 The players hit slightly better when *not* protected. In 5092 protected AB, the difference would be two points of batting average and fifteen points of slugging average, and in 7407 unprotected AB, it would be one point of batting average and ten points of slugging average. The overall difference is thus three points of BA and 26 points of SLG (not 25 because of rounding) In baseball terms, that's a small split, with little effect on the players' value. But in statistical terms, it's actually fairly large because of the huge sample; 12499 AB is almost one-sixth of all the AB in the AL that year. I estimate the standard deviation of the difference in SLG to be .015. Thus the .026 isn't statistically significant evidence that protection hurts hitters, or even that it doesn't help, but it is statistically significant evidence that protection doesn't help SLG by more than .004. There also wasn't any consistency to the players who were helped or hurt by protection, which suggests that there isn't an ability which helps some subset of the players. Phillips and Ventura had almost identical batting records, but they had the most extreme splits in opposite directions. Reynolds and Cuyler were similar players with opposite splits. Reimer and Sierra hit worse when protected, while Fielder and Henderson hit better. Three of the ten undisciplined hitters (less than one walk per 10 AB) hit better when protected, while seven hit worse. The evidence thus suggests that protection doesn't matter at the major-league level; it doesn't help to bat in front of a big-name hitter.